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Abstract 
The use of folktales and fables in explaining the physical and 
spiritual worlds to children is cross-cultural, and precedes recorded 
history. Prior studies indicate a developmental process in 
children’s understanding of fables and folktales (Jose, D’Anna, & 
Krieg, 2005; Narvaez, Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999). 
However, no known study has examined whether this 
developmental process is cross-cultural or culture specific. No 
known study also, has examined whether children as young as 6 
years of age are aware that fables and folktales are non-historical. 
The present study fills these observed gaps by examining moral 
didacticism in children aged 6-11 years. The children were drawn 
from two distinct nations and cultures (United States and Nigeria). 
The study tested the children’s ability to: (a) recognize that 
fables/folktales are not historical, and (b) deduce the moral lessons 
in fables/folktales. They were asked to identify the correct answers 
from a list of answer options. The older participants performed 
better than the younger participants. Limitations and directions for 
future studies are identified.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In every culture, people tell their children stories, and these 
stories are often in the forms of folktales and fables. As noted by 
Rupiper and Zeece (2005), folktales and fables constitute a 
traditional literature that preceded recorded history. They are 
intended to capture and explain the physical and spiritual worlds 
that constitute questions to children. They answer the whys, whats, 
and hows that characterize childhood. They answer questions such 
as: why do people die? What happens to the human being after 
death? Why do people commit moral transgressions? Why should 
people behave well? The narration of fables and folktales 
presupposes the receiver’s ability to extract a theme from the story. 
It presupposes the receiver’s ability to understand the story’s moral 
message. As rightly noted by Jose, D’Anna, and Krieg (2005), the 
receiver of folktales and fables derives the point of the stories by 
some inferential reasoning. Reasoning that is based on the outcome 
for the characters in the story: because “A” resulted in positive 
actions, then it is good to do “A”, and because “B” resulted in a 
negative outcome, it is not good to do “B”. The question becomes: 
are children able to do this kind of deductive reasoning? Do 
children understand fables and folktales? 
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The 18th century German philosopher Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau had argued that young children should not be taught 
fables because they do not understand them. He believed that the 
morals in them are so mixed and disproportionate to the age of 
children that they often end in the opposite of the intended result – 
vice, rather than virtue (Lewis, 2012)). What has changed? Fables 
and folktales are still told to children, either in oral or written 
forms. They are used for communication, construction of meaning, 
and for the transmission of cultural values (Tharinger et al., 2008). 
They are read to preschool children and constitute part of grade 
school basal reader series (Jose, et al., 2005). Fables and folktales 
are used as intervention technique in counseling and therapy with 
children (Tharinger et al., 2008; Costantino, Malgady & Rogler, 
1994; Fischer, 1984/1994; Gardner, 1993; Becker, Yehia, 
Donatelli & Santiago, 2002). Folktales and fables are found in 
most cultures, and some cultures place more emphasis on them 
than others.  
Do children understand fables and folktales? The fact that 
the genre of folktales and fables has existed for millennia indicates 
that it is not only the case that children understand them, but also 
that they fulfill some important function as text structure. Prior 
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studies observed a developmental process in children’s 
understanding of fables and folktales (Jose et al., 2005; Narvaez,  
Gleason, Mitchell, & Bentley, 1999).  The present study advances 
the studies by asking the following questions: are young children 
aware that fables and folktales are non-historical? If there is a 
developmental process in children’s understanding of fables and 
folktales, is this developmental process cross-cultural? Does 
culture matter in children’s development of moral didacticism. We 
hypothesize that, (a) age is a factor in children’s moral didacticism, 
(b) the effect of age is cross-cultural, and (c) culture matters. This 
study will be a caution to users of fables and folktales in the 
education and treatment of children.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Review of Literature 
Development of Moral Reasoning 
Understanding the developmental course of moral 
reasoning will help us understand the use of folktales and fables in 
communicating lessons.  Humans unlike other mammals, need an 
extended period of immaturity to prepare for adulthood. Other 
mammals are able to care for themselves right after weaning. 
Humans require 7-8 years to reach a marginal degree of 
independence (Periss, Blasi, & Bjorklund, 2012).  For children to 
get to the adult level of adequacy in the understanding of mental 
states, they have to go through certain rudimentary stages such as 
joint attention, appreciation of intentionality, and the appreciation 
that people can differ in perspectives (Kaysili & Acarlar, 2011; 
Smetana, Jambon, Conry-Murray, & Sturge-Apple, 2012). Piaget 
posited four stages of human cognitive development: Sensorimotor 
stage, Preoperational stage, Concrete Operational stage, and the 
Formal Operational stage. These different stages are different 
modes of thinking, through which human beings transit from 
infancy to adulthood. Each stage is characterized by qualitatively 
different patterns of thinking (Cartwright, 2001).  The implication 
of these differences is that the manner in which folkways and 
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moral lessons are convened to children should change 
developmentally. 
In a commentary on Piaget’s stages of cognitive 
development, Malerstein and Ahern (1979) noted that the 
sensorimotor stage (birth to 24 months) is the period when the 
child who has just evolved from an undifferentiated state with 
some natural biological characteristics such as reflexes, comes to 
recognize the outside world as different from himself, and begins 
the initial use of symbols. In the early sensorimotor stage, the 
infant is aware of only the things that are immediate to him: only 
what he sees exist. About the ages of 7-9 months, the infant 
develops object permanence; an object continues to exist though he 
can no longer see it. In the Preoperational stage (2-7 years), the 
child generally understands the essence of an object and no longer 
confuses one object with another or a part with the whole. He is 
able to think symbolically. In the Concrete Operational stage (8-11 
years), the child develops a sense that the thoughts and feelings of 
an individual are unique to him and may not be shared by those 
around him. At this stage, the child is able to take the intentions of 
a transgressor into consideration in the judgment of the severity of 
transgressions. In the Formal Operational stage (adolescent to 
adulthood), the individual is able to do abstract thinking. For 
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Piaget (1932/1965), moral judgment develops along a stage-like 
developmental process, along the line of reasoning-based 
cognition. For him, children younger than 7 or 8 years have a 
“heteronomous thinking”. They believe that rules originate from 
authorities, and rules are unchangeable. They also believe that the 
consequence of an action determines the goodness or badness of 
the action. According to Piaget, children develop an “autonomous 
morality” after the age of 11 years. In this stage, they understand 
that rules originate from social interactions and agreement, and 
they are changeable. Children also come to see intention as more 
important than consequence in actions.  
Moran and O’Brien (1983) regarded as too simplistic, 
Piaget’s conception that young children under the age of 7 or 8 
years focus on consequence rather than intention in their judgment 
of others. They argued that under certain circumstances such as 
when the degree of property damage is held constant, children of 
about 5 years of age use intention as a basis for their moral 
judgment. According to them, consequence-based judgments are 
used by children prior to age 4.5 years in cases concerning damage 
to property, but in cases involving damage to another person, they 
use intention-based judgments. For Kaysili & Acarlar (2011), 
children might understand perceptions, desires, and emotions by 
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the age of 2 years. By the age of 3 years, they can distinguish 
between mental and physical worlds, and might be able to 
understand subjectivity of thoughts. By the age of 3 or 4 years, 
they are able to separate thinking from doing. Nunner-Winkler and 
Sodian (1988) believed that preschoolers are good at the attribution 
of simple general purpose emotions such as happiness and sadness 
to others, but are rarely able to refer to more complex emotions 
such as shame, guilt or remorse in their everyday speeches. 
According to them, children who are 4 years of age base their 
judgment of actions on their successful outcomes. They expect the 
wrongdoer to experience positive emotions. At the age of 8 years, 
they focus their judgment on the moral value of an action and thus 
attribute negative feelings to a wrongdoer. For Berk (2012), 
children’s narratives increase in organization, detail, and 
expressiveness as a result of improved memory. Children who are 
4-5 years of age are able to narrate what happened, 6-7 year olds 
can embellish their narratives with orienting information (such as 
time and place) and connectives. By age 8-9 years, they are able to 
make evaluative comments on narratives.  
In sum, there is a consensus that cognition and moral 
judgments follow a developmental continuum, though there 
continues to be disagreement as to the nature of the developmental 
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changes in moral reasoning over time. In the present study, we 
expect that age would be a factor in children’s moral didacticism. 
We expect that, for the younger children (compared to older ones), 
the emotional salience of a story (more than anything else) would 
inform what moral judgment they make about a story, and what 
moral message they take out of it. 
Cultural Variation in the Use of Fables and Folktales 
Every culture is endowed with rich literary resources. Such 
literary resources include folktales and fables. Cross-cultural 
characteristics of these tales include good overcoming evil, good 
behavior rewarded and bad behavior punished, and justice 
prevailing over evil. Today, folktales and fables in the framework 
of storytelling has for the most part given way for written forms 
(picture books), especially among the Western cultures. According 
to a contemporary children’s book author Jennifer Armstrong 
(2010), fables and folktales are written to share with children, 
information about the natural world. They are intended to 
encourage a sense of stewardship in children, and elicit 
compassion, gentleness, wonder, and curiosity in them. They are 
also intended to encourage children to identify with, and share in 
the triumph of small, defenseless creatures. They provide children 
with interesting and enriching literary experiences, broadening 
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their worldview. They “connect past generations with the present 
and the present with future listeners and readers” (Rupiper & 
Zeece, 2005).  
By way of assessment feedback, fables and folktales are 
used as treatment techniques in therapy and counseling with 
children. As observed by Tharinger et al. (2008), because direct 
feedback can be emotionally overwhelming for children, 
discussing the results of psychological assessments directly with 
them is a difficult and often unsuccessful task. Individualized 
fables and folktales are used as veritable instruments for providing 
indirect and successful assessment feedback to children. They can 
reduce in children, the shame associated with assessment results, 
thereby helping them to take-in the assessments without raising 
their defenses or overtaxing their mental and emotional 
capabilities. Fables and folktales can provide children with an 
experience of accurate mirroring, and can become a transitional 
object for the child to hold on to, and reread severally after the 
feedback session. 
Fables and folktales are used by the Igbos of Nigeria to 
socialize their young ones. It is a veritable vehicle for imparting 
moral standards and navigating culture, and they are traditionally 
in the framework of storytelling. The “elders” who are the 
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custodians of the culture and are seen as the link between the 
ancestors and the living have the responsibility of ensuring the 
survival of the people’s culture. They “elders” are also the moral 
guardians of the community. As one Igbo proverb puts it: “may 
death spare at least one elder, that children may learn that vultures 
are not edible”. Through folktales and fables, the “elders” hand 
down the moral principles of the culture to the younger 
generations. They attend to the varied fears that children encounter 
in their troubled world through fables and folktales. Igbo folktales 
and fables feature both animals and human beings. They are 
humorous, making them entertaining and attractive to children. 
The weak overcoming the strong, the bewilderment of foolishness, 
and the trickery of cunning characters are featured in the fables and 
folktales. These features attract children’s attention and arouse 
their emotions (Jirata, 2011). Above all, fables and folktales are 
moralistic. Major characteristics of Igbo fables and folktales 
include, evil never overcoming good, virtue is rewarding and vice 
is detrimental.  
As noted by Ilias, Georgios, Marianthi, and Georgia (2010), 
folklore and school, especially in Europe and America, were for 
some time seen as opposed to each other, whereby folklore 
represented the unofficial traditional culture, and school 
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represented the bureaucratic structures of the state. The educational 
reforms that took place in Europe and America in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, however, changed the course of thinking. Folk 
expressions began to be seen as a veritable educational tool, giving 
fables and folktales a central position in folklorist and educationist 
studies as they offer reference points for didactic purposes. Fables 
and folktales form an important part of the cultural goods 
addressed to children. 
The moral point of a fable or folktale is deduced by 
inferential reasoning. Therefore, moral judgment, moral emotions, 
and theory of mind are some factors that influence children’s 
ability to deduce moral lessons from them. Though fables and 
folktales have nearly an age long history, writings on the topic are 
very scanty in the field of psychology despite their contributions in 
different fields of psychology (cognitive, developmental, 
counseling and clinical psychology).  
According to Narvaez et al. (1999), there was the 
assumption that reading moral stories to children improves their 
moral literacy. They set out to test this claim. Specifically, they 
examined whether children can truly extract moral themes from a 
story. They also investigated the developmental differences in 
moral theme comprehension. To this end, they recruited 132 
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participants from “city elementary school”: 50 third graders 
averaging 8.5 years in age (28 girls and 22 boys), and 54 fifth 
graders averaging 10.75 years in age (34 girls and 20 boys). They 
tested the participants in two 50-minute sessions, one week apart. 
The stories were put on audio tape as well as on paper for the 
children. The older children received only the written version. The 
tests were conducted in three groups according to grade. After 
hearing and reading each story, the children were asked to think 
about the message of the story. After a period of thinking, 
participants answered 10 true or false questions about the story. 
This was to assess their reading comprehension. For a vignette 
rating, participants read four vignettes and were then asked to rate 
each story according to how it matches the participant’s own-
target-message on a Likert-type scale. In their results, they 
observed that reading moral stories to children does not guarantee 
their grasp of the moral message or theme intended by the author. 
They observed that stories were understood differently even among 
grade school children. They also observed that there are 
developmental differences in the comprehension of moral themes – 
the younger children were less likely to choose the correct message 
or vignette. Though for all ages, the most attractive distracter-type 
for the vignettes was the one with the same actions as the target 
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story, this attraction decreased with age. Finally, they observed that 
moral theme comprehension requires something more than general 
reading comprehension. Even when standardized reading 
comprehension and vocabulary scores were used as covariates 
along with reading comprehension items, significant differences 
between the third- and fifth-grade students on moral theme 
comprehension tasks were still observed.  
Jose et al. (2005) observed that fables occupy a prominent 
position in the basal reader series of grade school children. They 
therefore, set out to explore why children like fables and how they 
comprehend the moral messages that fables convey. They sought 
to identify whether the developmental patterns in fable moral 
production and belief in a just world are related to each other over 
the age range from children to young adults, and the 
developmental patterns of the two phenomena. They hypothesized 
that older children and adults would use the belief in a just world 
in their moral evaluations of story outcomes and tested their 
hypothesis with two experiments. For Study 1, they recruited 39 
kindergartners, 37 first or second graders, 47 third or fourth 
graders, and 48 fifth to eighth graders from two public schools in 
the suburban Chicago area. The participants were predominantly 
White and middle class. Boys and girls were about evenly 
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distributed, and 54 college students were also tested. The child 
participants were given four stories in a random order: a human 
just-world story, an animal just-world story, a normal fable and a 
reversed-outcome fable. On the other hand, the adult participants 
were given eight stories in a random order. The stories were read 
by the experimenter to the kindergartners, the first and second 
graders. The results supported their hypothesis: participants 
showed just-world reasoning, and there were marked 
developmental trends in the comprehension and appreciation of the 
moral narratives. The older children saw canonical fables to have 
fairer outcomes, liked the outcomes more, and liked the stories 
more than the reversed-outcome fables. A developmental trend 
was also observed for ratings of outcome liking in just-world 
stories: the older children liked the outcomes in canonical just-
world stories more than the outcomes in non-canonical just-world 
stories.  
For Study 2, Jose et al. (2005) recruited 40 kindergartners, 
40 second graders, 40 fourth graders, and 40 sixth graders from 
four Catholic schools in the Chicago area. The children were 
predominantly Euro-Americans from middle class background. 
The children were assessed individually in a quiet room. There 
were three components of each assessment: (a) participants were 
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read a series of three short moral stories and thereafter asked 
questions from them; (b) they were asked to interpret a set of four 
proverbs; and (c) they were asked the meaning of six metaphors. 
Three stories (a normal fable, a reversed-outcome fable, and a just-
world story) were randomly presented to each child participant. A 
list of metaphors and proverbs were also read to the participants in 
a fixed order. The results replicated Study 1: canonical fables were 
judged to be fairer than outcomes of reversed-outcome fables, and 
the canonical fables were also liked more than the reversed-
outcome fables. As in Study 1, the older children made clearer 
distinctions between the two types of story than the younger 
children. 
Jose et al. (2005) noted that young children’s understanding 
of fable as a figurative literary structure is poor, just as it is in their 
understanding of other types of metaphors. However, they 
evidenced by their results that there is a developmental trend in 
children’s acquisition of the just-world belief. 
Ilias et al. (2010) acknowledged that folktales have a 
central place in studies of folklorists and educationalists, and they 
offer multiple reference points for didactic purposes. For them, 
folktales are suitable for the learning process which regards pupils 
as active and creative subjects, and not just simple receivers. They 
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believed that children understand and explain folktales according 
to their age. They examined the complex relation of children with 
the world of folktales, as a means of reshaping the known world. 
To achieve their objective, Ilias et al. (2010) recruited 2283 pupils 
from the 4th, 5th and 6th classes of elementary schools. They also 
employed a diffusion of the research sample by combining urban 
and rural areas. Of the participants, 85% declared Greece as their 
place of birth, slightly more than 5% were born in Albania, and 
2.5% were born in other countries, while about 7% did not declare 
their country of birth. Ilias et al. (2010) expected that the 
“diversion of the parent’s origin among children born and/or 
studying in the same place” would make a difference regarding the 
child’s view of folktales. Participants responded to questionnaires 
that focused on folktales as texts and “oral storytelling as a 
complex procedure”. Most of the questions were “closed” with the 
possibility of a question having more than one answer. A five-
point Likert-type scale was used (1 = very frequently and 5 = 
never). Some questions were open with space for respondents to 
write words, phrases, or sentences. In their results, they observed 
that about 40% of the participants discerned the imaginary/mythic 
element of folktales. On average, 7.5% of the participants stressed 
the entertainment aspect of the folktales, 5% stressed the 
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educational/moral aspect, and 1% mentioned oral and traditional 
character as the primary distinguishing aspect of folktales. 
According to the results, younger pupils showed more fondness for 
folktales, but as Ilias et al. (2010) noted, this “does not indicate 
that folktales are themselves suited better in mental terms to 
younger ages”. 
Impact of Culture on the Development of Moral Reasoning 
Does culture matter? Experiences influence people’s 
worldview. Individuals who have lived through a dictatorial 
government for example, are not likely to perceive or define 
government in the same way as individuals who have only 
experienced a healthy democratic system of government. Cultural 
psychologists argue that because individuals living in different 
cultural settings have different experiences, and because these 
cultural perspectives provide new insights into the individuals’ 
psychological processes, culture matters (Oyserman and Lee, 
2008; Piaget, 1972; & Cartwright, 2001). Individualism and 
collectivism are not mere nomenclatures distinguishing cultural 
groups; they articulate the basic differences in how cultural groups 
perceive the relationship between the individual and society. While 
the individual is the focus of action in an individualistic society, 
the group is the core unit in a collectivistic society. The differences 
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between individualism and collectivism have effects on the 
individuals involved: how they perceive the self, how they 
conceive relationships with others, what is made salient in their 
worldview, and how the individuals perceive themselves and the 
social world. 
Studies have shown that there are cross-cultural differences 
in social knowledge and basic cognitive processes (Oyserman, 
Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009; Nisbett, 2003; Shahaeian, 
Peterson, Slaughter, and Wellman, 2011). Oyserman et al., (2009) 
noted that Americans are more accurate and faster than Chinese in 
the recall of abstract and central information, whereas in matters of 
details and wholeness, Chinese are more accurate than Americans. 
Americans are more accurate in matters of absolute zero than 
Japanese, whereas Japanese are more accurate in matters of 
proportionality. Japanese are more accurate than Americans in 
line-drawing tasks that require recall of lines in relation to a 
provided background, whereas Americans are more accurate than 
Japanese in the same task when it is separate from the background 
(Oyserman, & Lee, 2008). These studies show that culture 
influences cognition. So, culture matters. 
Shahaeian et al., (2011) observed that when children 
acquire theory of mind (ToM), they come to understand 
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individuals’ behavior as the product of their internal, subjective 
mental state. They noted that, preschoolers with siblings in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia master 
ToM of false belief earlier than children without sibling. Siblings 
provide opportunities for interactions, family discussions, and 
pretend play. 
In sum, cultural differences exist in cognition. The present 
study examines whether these differences extend to the 
development of moral didacticism in children. 
Research Questions 
Jose et al. (2005) were interested in the developmental 
trend in fable moral production and belief in a just world, seeking a 
connection between the two phenomena. Narvaez et al. (1999) 
examined whether children can deduce moral themes from stories 
and the developmental differences in moral theme comprehension. 
The present study furthers the discourse on children’s 
understanding of fables and folktales by examining the following 
questions: (a) are children as young as 6 years of age aware that 
fables and folktales are non-historical? (b)  If it is true that 
children’s understanding of fables and folktales follows a 
developmental process, is the process cross-cultural or culture-
specific? In other words, does culture matter? 
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It is hypothesized that: (a) age is a factor in children’s 
moral didacticism, such that, of the three age groups (6-7yrs, 8-
9yrs, and 10-11yrs), the third group will fare best in the test and 
the first group will be worst off, (b) the effect of age is cross-
cultural, and (c) culture matters. It is predicted that the children 
from Nigeria (collectivistic society) will do better in the test of 
moral didacticism than the children from the United States 
(individualistic society). 
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CHAPTER 3 
Method 
Participants 
This cross-cultural study was conducted in Nigeria and the 
United States. Participants were selected from one Catholic school 
in Owerri, Imo State of Nigeria, and one Catholic school in 
Houston Texas, United States. Permission was obtained from the 
school principals to visit the classrooms and make the activity part 
of the regular classroom lessons.  Being a part of classroom 
lessons, parental consent was not required. Permission to conduct 
the study was obtained from the Marshall University Institutional 
Review Board (IRB).   
From the United States (US) school, we recruited 20 
children aged 6-7 years (Boys – 7, Girls – 13, M = 6.3, SD = 0.47), 
20 children aged 8-9 years (Boys – 9, Girls – 11, M = 8.25, SD = 
0.44), and 20 children aged 10-11 years (Boys – 7, Girls – 13, M = 
10.15, SD = 0.37). All the students were African Americans and 
from middle class families. From the Nigerian school, we recruited 
20 children aged 6-7 years (Boys – 9, Girls – 11, M = 6.45, SD = 
0.51), 20 children aged 8-9 years (Boys – 7, Girls – 13, M = 8.35, 
SD = 0.49), and 20 children aged 10-11 years (Boys – 10, Girls – 
10, M = 10.25, SD = 0.44). All the students were Nigerians and 
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from middle class families.  The result is a 2 (Nigeria vs. US) X 3 
(age groups) factorial design.  
Procedure 
The study was conducted in the children’s schools and in 
their respective classrooms. To test the hypotheses, two stories 
were read to the participants; the Tortoise and the Hare (see 
Appendix A) and, the Tortoise and the Dog (see Appendix B). All 
the students heard both stories. The stories and questions were 
typed and duplicated. Each student got a copy of each of the 
stories, with questions that followed (see Appendix C). The stories 
were read to the students by their class teachers. At the end of each 
story, participants were required to answer the questions that 
followed. They were asked to circle the correct options. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Results 
In each of the two schools, the study was conducted in the 
students’ respective classrooms. Every member of the class was 
allowed to take the test irrespective of age. At the end of the tests, 
the results were separated according to age. Those who were not 
within the age bracket of 6-11 years were rejected. Each 
participant received points for the total number of questions 
answered correctly. Only questions 8-11 were used in the test for 
didacticism. If the question was answered correctly, a point was 
awarded.  Total number of questions answered correctly served as 
the dependent variable.  Therefore, the total score for any one 
subject ranged from 0 to 4.  A summary of the average scores are 
presented in the table below. 
Table 1 
Average Number of Questions Answered Correctly by Nationality 
and Age 
______________________________________________________
Nationality      Ages 6 – 7yrs     Ages 8 – 9yrs       Ages 10 – 11yrs 
 
                             M        SD             M        SD             M       SD_  
   
United States        0.55    0.94           1.20    1.24        1.60    1.60 
           
Nigeria                 1.00    1.03           1.95    1.15        2.30    1.42 
______________________________________________________ 
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Results show that the youngest children (6-7yrs) overall, 
answered fewer items correctly than either of the two older groups 
(8-9yrs and 10-11yrs). To test the hypothesis that age affects moral 
didacticism, a one-way ANOVA was conducted on subjects’ 
correct answer scores. Alpha level of .05 was used. True to our 
first hypothesis, results showed that age has a significant effect on 
children’s moral didacticism, F(5, 108) = 6.21, p < .0005. For our 
second hypothesis, results indicated that nationality has a main 
effect on children’s moral didacticism, F(1, 108) = 7.06, p < .01.  
No significant interaction between age and nationality was 
observed. Post hoc multiple comparisons were conducted using 
Tukey Honest Significant Difference (Tukey HSD). Results 
revealed that the youngest children (age 6yrs) were worst off in the 
test. They performed significantly worse than children aged: 11 
years (p < .0005), 10 years (p < .0005), and 9 years (p < .0005), but 
not significantly different from children aged: 8 years (p = .084), 
and 7 years (p = .114). The older groups (ages 7-11) did not differ 
significantly from one another. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Discussion 
The present study explores the developmental trend in 
children's ability to deduce the moral lessons of fables and 
folktales. Our results show an improvement in performance with 
increasing age. This supports our first hypothesis that age is a 
factor in moral didacticism. Children aged 6-7 years were the 
worst off, and the children aged 10-11 years performed best. The 
improvement in performance with increasing age is found among 
students in both countries. It therefore, supports our second 
hypothesis that the developmental process in children’s moral 
didacticism is cross-cultural. Our third hypothesis – that culture 
matters – was also supported by the results. 
The results of this study have some implications for 
society. We noted earlier that fables and folktales are used for 
various purposes, such as communication, transmission of cultural 
values, counseling and therapy with children. Our results indicate 
that children understand and explain folktales according to their 
age. This study therefore, brings caution to bear on the use of 
fables and folktales in the education and treatment of children. 
Though most of our subjects loved the stories, results show that 
they did not understand the intended moral message. We are not 
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saying that children cannot understand fables and folktales, and we 
are not of the position that fables and folktales should not be used 
with children. Our position is, caution should be applied when they 
are used with children because they do not understand moral 
stories like adults. There is a difference between liking a story and 
understanding the story. Children’s differential interpretations of 
fables and folktales should always be kept in mind.  
Our hypothesis that culture matters in the moral didacticism 
of children was supported by our results. However, the fact that 
about 60% of the Nigerian subjects indicated that they were 
hearing the story of the tortoise and the dog for the first time 
throws caution. Jirata (2011) described how the people of Southern 
Ethiopia (a collectivistic society) observed their night recreations. 
At night time, he noted, when all family members have returned 
from their daily workplaces, people from the same neighborhood 
gather in one home where adults share what happened during the 
day, and parents and grandparents tell folktales to children, while 
the children admire and learn. The traditional Igbo society shared 
this way of life some years ago, but that is hardly the case in most 
areas today. As the communities get urbanized, they shift from 
collectivism to individualism. Socio-demographic change has been 
identified as a propeller of changes in cultural values (Greenfield, 
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2009). Tönnies (1887/1957) introduced the concepts of 
Gemeinschaft (communal society) and Gesellschaft (associational 
society) to categorize social systems. The Gemeinschaft is 
typically the rural, educational and technologically poor 
environment, governed by traditional social norms. In contrast, the 
Gesellschaft is the urban and large scale society, with government 
bureaucracies. Greenfield (2009) identified the Gemeinschaft with 
collectivistic qualities, and associated the Gesellschaft with 
individualistic qualities. For him, when any of the variables of the 
two prototypical environments (Gemeinschaft and Gesellchaft) 
shifts either toward Gemeinschaft or Gesellschaft, developmental 
pathways, learning environments and social values also shift 
toward the same direction. In our study, results show a movement 
toward Gesellschaft. Such a movement involves both the 
environment and the individual. As a community becomes more 
urban and commerce driven, it is not only the environment that is 
transformed, the modes of socialization, learning and cultural 
values are also transformed.  
In the Gemeinschaft, there are such collectivistic values as 
respect for parents and elders, and expectations that children will 
take care of their aged parents. One of the difficulties of the 
movement from Gemeinschaft to Gesellschaft is intergenerational 
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conflict. Families having parents who grew up with Gemeinschaft 
socialization, and children of the Gesellschaft socialization. This 
intergenerational change often brings intergenerational conflict. 
The results of this study therefore, is a wakeup call for the Igbo 
society to prepare for this movement from Gemeinschaft to 
Gesellchaft. This movement calls for adaptations on the parts of 
both parents and children. Parents should prepare for an 
environment where the “we” is replaced by the “I”, a society where 
the nuclear family is isolated from the extended family, and a 
society where the children might not be taking care of their parents 
in old age. On the part of the children, they have to adapt to the 
cross cutting socialization. They have to deal with socialization 
messages from both the Gemeischaft environment (home) and the 
Gesellschaft environment (school).  
Limitations and Way Forward 
Our subject were chosen from Catholic elementary schools 
(private schools). Private schools are often not affordable for the 
low socio-economic groups. Public elementary schools, however, 
may consist of predominantly children of the low socio-economic 
group. We suggest, future studies should take into consideration 
socio-economic status.  
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Pressed by the fact that 60% of our subjects in Nigeria 
indicated that they have never heard the story of the tortoise and 
the dog, we made further inquiries. Our inquiries revealed that a 
good number of the students in our pilot school live in the school 
hostel (did not live in their homes most of the times). The fact that 
our study was carried out in a city, and in a school with children 
who left home at a very early age, may have had an effect on our 
results. Again, cities being melting pots of cultures may have had 
an effect on our results. We recommend that future studies in 
Nigeria should be conducted in rural traditional settings.  
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Appendix A 
The Tortoise and the Hare 
Once upon a time there was a hare who, boasting how he 
could run faster than anyone else, was forever teasing tortoise for 
its slowness. Then one day, the irate tortoise answered back: “Who 
do you think you are? There’s no denying you’re swift, but even 
you can be beaten!” The hare squealed with laughter. “Beaten in a 
race? By whom? Not you, surely! I bet there’s nobody in the world 
that can win against me, I’m so speedy. Now, why don’t you try?” 
Annoyed by such bragging, the tortoise accepted the challenge. A 
course was planned, and the next day at dawn they stood at the 
starting line. The hare yawned sleepily as the meek tortoise 
trudged slowly off. When the hare saw how painfully slow his rival 
was, he decided, half asleep on his feet, to have a quick nap. “Take 
your time!” he said. “I’ll have forty winks and catch up with you in 
a minute.” 
The hare woke with a start from a fitful sleep and gazed 
round, looking for the tortoise. But the creature was only a short 
distance away, having barely covered a third of the course. 
Breathing a sigh of relief, the hare decided he might as well have 
breakfast too, and off he went to munch some cabbages he had 
noticed in a nearby field. But the heavy meal and the hot sun made 
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his eyelids droop. With a careless glance at the tortoise, now 
halfway along the course, he decided to have another snooze 
before flashing past the winning post. And smiling at the thought 
of the look on the tortoise’s face when it saw the hare speed by, he 
fell fast asleep and was soon snoring happily. The sun started to 
sink, below the horizon, and the tortoise, who had been plodding 
towards the winning post since morning, was scarcely a yard from 
the finish. At that very point, the hare woke with a jolt. He could 
see the tortoise a speck in the distance and away he dashed. He 
leapt and bounded at a great rate, his tongue lolling, and gasping 
for breath. Just a little more and he’d be first at the finish. But the 
hare’s last leap was just too late, for the tortoise had beaten him to 
the winning post. Poor hare! Tired and in disgrace, he slumped 
down beside the tortoise who was silently smiling at him. “Slowly 
does it every time!” he said (“childhoodreading.com,” 1997).  
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Appendix B 
The Tortoise and the Dog 
After the creation of the world, God invited the dog and the 
tortoise to send them into the world to proclaim either mortality or 
immortality for humans. The dog carried the decree of immortality 
while the tortoise carried that of mortality. Whichever of the two 
animals that got into the world first was to promulgate its decree 
and its decree would be the order. The two animals set out running 
from heaven into the world, and the dog ran much faster than the 
tortoise. The dog, however, would branch off from time to time to 
scavenge for food, and each time it got distracted with scavenging 
for food, the tortoise would meet it and pass it. When the dog is 
done with scavenging, it would set out again, running fast and 
would pass the tortoise, but only to branch off again at some other 
point for food scavenging. Eventually, the tortoise got to the world 
before the dog and decreed that humans would die. 
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Appendix C 
Thesis Questions 
1. I am a (a) boy     (b) girl 
2. I am (a) 6   (b) 7   (c) 8   (d) 9   (e) 10   (f) 11 years old 
3. I am in (a) 1st   (b) 2nd   (c) 3rd   (d) 4th    (e) 5th   (f) 6th grade  
4. Do you like the story? (Yes/No) 
5. Does your family tell stories? (Yes/no) 
6. Have you heard the story before? (Yes/No) 
7. Was there a bird in the story? (Yes/No) 
8. Where did the story take place? (A: I do not know, B: it 
             never happened, C: Texas, D: China).  
9. When did it happen? (A: I do not know, B: it never 
             happened, C: 1900, D: before I was born)  
10. What does the story teach us? (A: to run fast, B: not to eat 
             while working, C: to stay on track, D: to be respectful)  
11. What is the lesson of the story (A: hard-work, B: respect, 
             C: sincerity, D: stay on track)  
Questions 1-6 deal with personal information. Question 7 
tests the readiness of the subjects for the test. Students who failed 
question 7 were judged not “ready for the test” and their entire 
results were rejected. Only two of the tested students had their 
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answers thrown out on the basis of question 7. The test of our 
thesis was based on questions 8 – 11.  
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